How many us military interventions

Rightist death squads slaughtered Salvadoran civilians who questioned the concentration of power and wealth in a few hands. CIA-trained Nicaraguan Contra rebels launched terrorist attacks against civilian clinics and schools run by the Sandinista government, and mined Nicaraguan harbors.

A troop and bombing raid to free U. Embassy hostages held in downtown Tehran had to be aborted in the Iranian desert. After the Israeli occupation of Lebanon , U. Navy ships rained enormous shells on Muslim civilian villages. Syria and the Muslim rebels emerged victorious in Lebanon. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the U.

The bombing raid killed civilians, and may have led to the later revenge bombing of a U. Over 2, Panamanians were killed in the invasion to capture one leader. The following year, the U. In January , the U. Up to , Iraqis were killed in the war and its imemdiate aftermath of rebellion and disease, including many civilians who died in their villages, neighborhoods, and bomb shelters. In the s, the U. Foremost among them was the deployment in the African nation of Somalia , torn by famine and a civil war between clan warlords.

Instead of remaining neutral, U. Enraged crowds, backed by foreign Arab mercenaries, killed 18 U. Even then, it never intervened to stop atrocities by Croatian forces against Muslim and Serb civilians, because those forces were aided by the U.

In , the U. The bombing intensified Serbian expulsions and killings of Albanian civilians from Kosovo , and caused the deaths of thousands of Serbian civilians, even in cities that had voted strongly against Milosevic. Even when the U. After the bombings of two U. Bin Laden retaliated by attacking a U. Navy ship docked in Yemen in After the terror attacks on the United States, the U. Such a campaign will certainly ratchet up the cycle of violence, in an escalating series of retaliations that is the hallmark of Middle East conflicts.

Afghanistan, like Yugoslavia, is a multiethnic state that could easily break apart in a new catastrophic regional war. First, they were explained to the U. In the few cases when U. Third, the U. Fourth, the U. This strategy tends to enflame rather than dampen a war or civil conflict, as shown in the cases of Somalia and Bosnia, and deepens resentment of the U.

Fifth, U. Rather than solving the root political or economic roots of the conflict, it tends to polarize factions and further destabilize the country. The same countries tend to reappear again and again on the list of 20th century interventions. Sixth, U. Take the list of current regimes most singled out for U. Every country, every ethnicity, every religion, contains within it the capability for extreme violence. Every group contains a faction that is intolerant of other groups, and actively seeks to exclude or even kill them.

War fever tends to encourage the intolerant faction, but the faction only succeeds in its goals if the rest of the group acquiesces or remains silent. The attacks of September 11 were not only a test for U. We must begin not by lashing out at civilians in Muslim countries, but by taking responsibility for our own history and our own actions, and how they have fed the cycle of violence. There is inevitably a degree of uncertainty about what the medium- or long-run consequences will be.

Societies are complex systems. Is the likely cost to Americans bearable? Here are the number of dead and wounded US soldiers from some past US military interventions: 9. There is also financial cost. A lengthy humanitarian intervention is harder to justify domestically than one based on national interest. It helps to spread the personnel and financial burden across a coalition of countries. But the Obama administration was not willing to send American ground troops.

Several days after the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, , President Obama was asked in a press conference whether it was time for a more aggressive approach.

In his response, Obama emphasized that an effective commitment of ground troops would have to be a large and lengthy one. We have a military strategy that is putting enormous pressure on ISIL through airstrikes, that has put assistance and training on the ground with Iraqi forces. We are taking strikes against high-value targets…. As we find additional partners on the ground that are effective, we work with them more closely. The one exception is that there have been a few who suggested that we should put large numbers of US troops on the ground.

Do we then send more troops into there? Or Libya, perhaps? Is international authorization needed? International institutions such as the United Nations and NATO are helpful, and one way to boost their legitimacy and effectiveness is for the United States to secure their approval for foreign military interventions. Indeed, Matthew Yglesias has argued that the projected impact on international institutions and rules should be the dominant consideration guiding any intervention decision.

But there are difficult cases. Another is Iraq Would it have been the right thing to do? A third is Darfur Would it have been wrong for the US to go in alone to stop the genocide? China and Russia each have a veto in the United Nations, and it can be difficult to secure their agreement.

However, this would formally split the world into two camps, and many experts believe the best way to deal with China and other nondemocracies is to work with them rather than against them.

We have little polling data on the specific question of humanitarian military intervention, but a number of surveys ask closely related questions. While figure 1 suggests reduced support for an active role in the s and s Vietnam and in the s Iraq , responses to other questions suggest no such change.

Figure 1. Data sources: Gallup for ; Pew Research Center for ff. Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5. The US should take into account the interests of our allies even if it means making compromises with them Estimated share of US adults. Figure 6. There is need, precedent, moral justification, and authorization by the United Nations as a general principle. How successful has the United States been historically at achieving political objectives during military operations?

What are the characteristics of U. How do such factors as the size of the intervention, the operating context, the local dynamics, and the international system influence the outcome of the intervention? General findings U. Combat and counterinsurgency interventions Particularly in the post era, the United States has generally been able to achieve its objectives in these interventions when it applies substantial numbers of forces, and particularly ground forces.

The effectiveness of U. Pre-intervention planning is a key factor influencing the ability of the United States to achieve its objectives. Stability operations The ability of the United States to focus on and achieve its political objectives in stability operations appears to diminish as the intensity of conflict increases.

Nonmilitary resources and pre-intervention planning can be central to success. The initial quality of host-nation political institutions and the support of the host-nation government can have a substantial effect on the success of stability operations. Third-party interference can substantially affect the likelihood of success. Match intervention strategy with objectives. The factors that promote success often vary, depending on the type of objective being pursued.

Before intervening, the United States should consider the political objectives it hopes to achieve and then consider the mix of military and nonmilitary tools best suited to achieving those objectives. Ensure sufficient force size. Sending more forces does not always promote success, but for certain types of objectives and interventions, greater capabilities may be essential.

Military planners should consider not only the operating context but also the specific political objectives to best determine the appropriate number of forces. Be realistic about expectations for success.